Show, by example, that we can find social welfare functions which satisfy any three of the four Arrow's axioms.

Question

I want to show, by example, that we can find social welfare functions which satisfy any three of the four Arrow's axioms.

Given at least three rewards, and at least two individuals, there is no social welfare function meeting the 4 axioms given by:

1. Unrestricted domain (full ordering requried)
2. No dictatorship (no individual whose preferences automatically become the group's)
3. Pareto's condition (if each individual has a particular preference, so does the group)
4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives (If a reward is removed, and everyone keeps the same preferences then so should the group)

Note that a social welfare function is a function which operates on preference profiles, obeying comparability and transitivity, and yields a group preference $\geq_g$ over the rewards which obeys comparability and transitivity.

Can you help me find an example where $3$ of the conditions hold?

Many thanks