Are axioms chosen with the goal of "making things work" instead of some deep philosophies?
If everything should be deducible, that is, provable from something else, then in this chain of deduction eventually you have to stop somewhere, because we can't work with infinity. So you have to accept some stuff as axioms, and you won't be able to find things from which you can deduce those axioms. You just accept them.
So the question then is, how do you choose where to stop? How do you choose the axioms? Is it done for the sake of making all known math work, or we have to do it based on some deep philosophies? But what if the philosophy is good, but still does not enable you to construct axioms from which you can build all the rest of math? Then it seems, you have to pick axioms, with the explicit goal of "making all the rest of math work".
Please give me some comments on this
I think that "things go" from new ideas and results and "problems", to new axioms which "systemathize" and organize and unify and ... those ideas and concepts.
Set theory :
Geometry :
Number theory :
You can see these "ingredients" in play into Ernst Zermelo, Investigations in the foundations of set theory I (1908) [quotations from Jean van Heijenoort (editor), From Frege to Gödel : A Source Book in Mathematical Logic 1879-1931 (1967), page 200-on] :
In this article, we can see also the so-called regressive strategy in place, i.e.to regard an axiom as true if it is useful to generate as theorems those results we already believe on other grounds to be true. This is the approach followed by Zermelo in his new proofs of the well-ordering theorem, which needs the "tool" of the axiom of choice.