I am reading Robert Wolf's A Tour Through Mathematical Logic and am enjoying it. But the author omits proofs for the Deduction and Generalization Theorems. I looked through Intermediate Logic by Bostock for a proof and it has a rather descriptive one.
But the author uses a set of three axioms.
- $\vdash P \to (Q \to P) $
- $\vdash (P \to (Q\to R)) \to ((P \to Q) \to (P \to R))$
- $ \vdash (\lnot Q \to \lnot P) \to (P \to Q) $
So to prove the base case in an Inductive proof the author uses the first axiom. That is to prove " If $\Gamma \cup \{P\} \vdash Q $ then $\Gamma \vdash P \to Q $ " he first treats the case when $Q$ is an Axiom. Then he says $ Q \to (P \to Q) $ is also an axiom and hence by Modus Ponens $ (P \to Q) $ is proveable without assumptions.
But when reading I thought these axioms constituted only an example of a First Order Theory. Then how were they used to prove the Deduction Theorem which is stated for an arbitrary First Order Theory $\Gamma$? Must a First Order Theory necessarily consist of these Axioms or something similar? What am I missing?
I think your confusion may arise from a misinterpretation of the Deduction Theorem, and of the terms "theory" and "proof system". In proof theory, a proof system $\mathscr P$ defines the context you are working in. It defines (in meta-language):
Note that I write "true" in quotes. This is because it really means provable by means of the proof system $\mathscr P$. Only at a later stage can we judge if this notion agrees with what we intuitively regard as true (basically, this amounts to the question if $\mathscr P$ "makes sense").
In the same context of proof theory, a theory $\Gamma$ is usually defined as simply a collection of formulas, as they are defined above. To clear all ambiguity, we might refer to $\mathscr P$-theories.
The notation $\Gamma \vdash P$ now means: If we accept $\Gamma$ as "true", then the proof system allows us to prove $P$. So effectively we enhance our system to have the formulas from $\Gamma$ as extra axioms, with which we can prove things.
Now the Deduction Theorem can be interpreted properly; it says the following:
In the case described by you, there is a trivial proof of $Q$, since $Q$ is an axiom. Together with the axiom $Q \to (P \to Q)$ and modus ponens, this means there is also a proof of $P \to Q$. That we did not use $P$ or any formula from $\Gamma$ does not, of course, influence the fact that we can prove $P \to Q$.
In conclusion, the Deduction Theorem is a theorem about (theories $\Gamma$ in) the proof system $\mathscr P$. It is not a theorem about the conceptual logical framework around $\mathscr P$ that we might also colloquially describe as a "theory". I hope that clears a bit of the fog for you — this whole dichotomy between reasoning within and about a proof system, together with the associated terminology, definitely takes time to get used to.