In "G"odel's Incompleteness Theorems" (p. 29), R. Smullyan gives the axioms of a version of first-order logic with identity (Kalish & Montague) as:
L1: $(F \supset (G\supset F))$
L2: $(F\supset (G\supset H))\supset ((F\supset G) \supset (F\supset H))$
L3: $((\sim F\supset \sim G)\supset (G\supset F))$
L4: $(\forall v(F\supset G)\supset (\forall v F\supset \forall v G))$
L5: $(F\supset \forall v F)$ ($v$ does not occur in $F$).
L6: $\exists v(v=t)$ ($v$ does not occur in $t$).
L7: $(v=t \supset (XvY \supset XtY))$ (Where $XvY$ is an atomic formula).
Here $F, G, H $ are formulas, $t$ is a term (the notion depends on the language, but let's say we're talking first-order arithmetic, in which case a 'term', roughly consists of variables, numerals, + and .) and $v$ is a variable. Further, the rules of inference are 1) Modus ponens and 2) from $F$ infer $\forall v F$.
So here's my question: How do you prove any formula of the type $\exists v F$? Doesn't look like you can get much from L6. The reason for my question is that after this (p. 61), when discussing $\omega$-consistency, he argues that from $F(\bar n)$ provable for some $n$ follows $\exists v F(v)$ provable.
For that matter, how do you use a formula of the type $\exists vF$?
The most likely assumption is that $\exists vF$ is considered to be an abbreviation for ${\sim}\forall v\,{\sim}F$ -- and you can then prove it using propositional reasoning together with the rules for $\forall$.