I am sure I have made a gross misunderstanding of Gödel's completeness theorems, as to me, it seems to follow that all sets of formulas are consistent.
Let $\Gamma$ be a set of formulas. If $\Gamma\vdash\psi$, then by Gödel's completeness theorem, $\Gamma\models\psi$.
Then $\Gamma\not\models(\neg\psi)$.
By Gödel again, $\Gamma\not\vdash(\neg\psi)$.
Hence, $\Gamma$ is consistent.
I am pretty sure there is a flaw in the above argument, but I can't quite pinpoint it.
Any help is sincerely appreciated!
Two things.
First of all, $\Gamma \vdash \psi$ implying $\Gamma \models \psi$ is known as the Soundness Theorem for the proof system $\vdash$ (i.e., "true premises do not prove false conclusions").
Now on your purported proof, the flaw occurs at "Then $\Gamma \not\models (\neg \psi)$". Namely, $\Gamma \not \models (\neg\psi)$ can only be valid if there is a model of $\Gamma$ in which $\neg \psi$ is false. In particular, we have tacitly assumed existence of a model of $\Gamma$ in the first place.
Thus your proof is circular.