7.2.1 Every truth value is confirmed by intuition that affirms it.
$(∀x)(Tx\to Ix)$
7.2.2. Every intuition that affirms truth value is a feeling of correctness.
$(∀x)(Ix\to Cx)$
7.2.3. The feeling of correctness cannot be proven to be a criterion for determining truth values.
$(∀x)(Cx\to \sim D)$
Ergo, there exists no tool for determining truth values.
$(∀x)\sim D$
I've been given the valid argument above. However, my translation shows an invalid argument, because its conclusion cannot possibly be derived from from its premises. Have I misunderstood the given argument?
Among other things, the argument assumes that determining a truth value, affirming a truth value, and a truth value being confirmed are all materially equivalent. Further the symbolic version of the argument could be more precise; for example,
$\forall x \exists y (Tx \implies (Cx \implies (Iy \land Ayx)))$
could be used instead of the first formula, where ‘C’ means “is confirmed” and ‘A’ means “affirms”.