If a theory is incomplete (meaning there exists a formula $A$ and $\neg A$ which neither of them is logically entailed from axioms of that theory), does that mean there exist a formula which is not decidable (meaning $A$ nor $\neg A$ is provable) from the axioms of that theory?
Or do I misunderstand the definition of a formula being undecidable from a set of axioms of a theory?
The confusion seems to arise from two different notions of "completeness" and what exactly decidability means, so let me start by clarifying the terminology:
Soundness just means that the calculus doesn't prove nonsense: If there is a proof of $\phi$ from premises $\Gamma$, then the inference $\Gamma \vDash \phi$ is actually semantically valid.
Semantic completeness means that every valid inference can be proven in the calculus. Note that this says nothing about the non-inferences.
Syntactic completeness means that for any formula $\phi$, either the formula itself or its negation can be proven from the axioms $\Gamma$. A formula of which this does not hold is said to be independent of the theory. I think that syntactic incompleteness is what you mean by (incorrectly) saying "undecidability".
Semi-decidability of logical inference only requires that all the inferences that are valid are detected; invalid ones may or may not be recognized as such (e.g., the algorithm may run into an infinite loop on some of the invalid sequents without ever yielding an answer). It may be that the algorithm fails to give an answer on none, some or all of the invalid inputs; in any case, all the valid inferences have to be detected.
Co-semi-decidability of inference means that the formulas which are not theorems are detected as such; inferences which do hold may or may not be recognized by the algorithm.
Decidability of logical inference requires that all the theorems and all the non-theorems are recognized after finite time.
A theory is called undecidable as soon as one of the requirements fails; it may still be that $T$ is semi-decidable, or that its complement is, but at least the algorithm won't terminate on all the inputs. Of course, a theory is also undecidable if neither its theorems nor its non-theorems will always be recognized.
The calculus of semantic trees on FOL is
Coming back to your original question, if a theory $\Gamma$ is incomplete (i.e. for some formulas $\phi$, neither $\Gamma \vDash \phi$ nor $\Gamma \vDash \neg \phi$), then if the calculus is sound w.r.t. the theory, yes, it will be syntactically incomplete (i.e. for some formulas $\phi$, neither $\Gamma \vdash \phi$ nor $\Gamma \vdash \neg \phi$). However, this is not the same as undecidability.
The important point to realize is that neither syntactic incompleteness nor undecidability contradicts semantic completeness:
- That the proof system is not syntactically complete just means (in combination with soundness) that not all formulas are either universally valid or contradictory in the theory. It is still the case that all those formulas which the axioms do semantically entail are provable ($\rightsquigarrow$ semantic completeness).
- That FOL inference is undecidable just means that the sequents which are not valid are not always recognized as such by the proof system. Again, it is still the case that all those formulas which do follow from the axioms are provable ($\rightsquigarrow$ semantic completeness).