Let $\sf HF$ be the set of hereditarily finite sets. It is well known that one can define a theory of computable/recursive functions on $\sf HF$ (as opposed to working with $\omega^k$): a relation $R\subseteq \sf HF^n$ is decidable iff $R$ is a $\Delta_1$ subset of $(\sf HF,\in)$, and a function $f:\sf HF^n\to \sf HF$ is computable iff it is decidable as a subset of $\sf HF^{n+1}$.
By work of Ackermann, this approach turns out to be equivalent to the usual one, in the sense that one has a (computable) bijection $\Gamma:\sf HF\to \omega$ which can be used to translate between the two notions of computable and see that they are morally the same.
The usual selling point of working with $\sf HF$ is that no coding is necessary, for $\sf HF\times \sf HF\subset \sf HF$ and similarly $\sf HF^{<\omega}\subset \sf HF$.
Can this be reproduced at $\sf HC$, the set of hereditarly countable sets, i.e. get an alternative definition of the projective hierarchy of sets of reals? Two of the problems I see are:
- Every set in $\sf HC$ can be coded by a real, but the coding is slightly arbitrary (as opposed to the Ackermann function), since we need to say "fix $x\in \sf HC$, and let $f:\omega\to \text{trcl}(\{x\})$ be a bijection (ignore the finite case), transfer the $\in$-relation on $\text{trcl}(\{x\})$ to $\omega$, take the collapse, etc".
- A set of reals $A$ is $\underset{\sim}{\Sigma}_2^1$ iff it is $\Sigma_1$ definable over $\sf HC$.
So (2) shows that levels of definability are not directly comparable as they are in the $\sf HF$ case, presumably because everything in $\sf HF$ is $\Delta_0$ definable, but no such thing is true of $\sf HC$.
Is there any way of making a theory of computability over $\sf HC$ work, or are things doomed from the get go?
One of the big problems is that $\mathsf{HC}$, unlike $\mathsf{HF}$, is rather underspecified by the usual axioms of set theory.
For example, one possibility is that $\mathsf{HC}=L_{\omega_1}$. Admissible levels of the $L$-hierarchy support a very good analogue of computability theory, namely $\alpha$-recursion theory. Sacks' book Higher recursion theory has a wealth of information on the topic; in particular, most standard priority arguments go through pretty effortlessly in $L_{\omega_1}$ (although there are exceptions, e.g. the existence of maximal c.e. sets). On the other hand, if for example we have large cardinals in our universe then $\mathsf{HC}$ lacks any simply-definable well-ordering, and this stands in the way of any sort of argument which would involve enumerating Turing machines.
I think it's helpful to identify four types of "computability on a transitive set" $T$:
In admissible recursion theory, we assume $T\models\mathsf{KP}$ (= Kripke-Platek set theory). In such a $T$ we have a natural notion of "finite" (= "element of $T$") and "c.e." (= "$\Sigma_1(T)$") which behave not too badly; however, we don't generally have a simple well-ordering of the universe so we can't perform searches or set up priority arguments.
In $\alpha$-recursion theory, $T=L_\alpha$ for some admissible ordinal $\alpha$. This improves on the previous bulletpoint, and $\alpha$-recursion generalizes classical computability theory rather well.
In $\beta$-recursion theory, $T=L_\beta$ for some non-admissible ordinal $\beta$. This is the dual situation to admissible recursion theory: we completely sacrifice replacement but require full "search capability." At this point the notion of finiteness becomes rather more nuanced; see Maass' paper, Recursively invariant $\beta$-recursion theory.
In principle we could keep going and look at transitive sets satisfying very weak set theories. Certainly there is work on such topics (see e.g. various papers of Mathias); however, my opinion is that in the absence of both replacement and searchability there isn't much computability-theoretic character left.