I saw this video: Tautologies and Contradictions; however, the example he claimed to be a tautology, "That dog is a mammal", is actually NOT a tautology, if I refer to the textbook, A Tour Through Mathematical Logic by Wolf:
(Page 11)
Definition. A statement P is called a tautology or law of propositional logic if there is a set of substatements of P such that:(a) P is a propositional combination of those substatements, and
(b) P is true for every combination of truth values that is assigned to these substatements.
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Example 3. The equation $2 + 2 = 4$ is not a tautology. Its only substatement is itself, [...] it's not a tautology because its form is simply "P", with no shorter substatements
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Similarly, "For every number x, x = x" is not a tautology. Simply put, it cannot be a tautology because it includes no connectives.
I am genuinely confused. I am sure this guy in the video is well-educated in math. (He got his math PhD from University of Toronto). So can "tautology" be defined differently depending on the "version" of mathematical logic theories? Or is the guy just misleading people (which I would be very surprised about, given his credentials)?
Thanks!

Let $d$ be that particular dog, $M(x)$ denote “$x$ is a mammal”, and ‘mammal’ be as defined by the Oxford dictionary.
Then “that dog is a mammal” is formalised as $$M$$ in propositional logic, and as $$M(d)$$ in predicate logic. In either case, the statement is an atomic sentence, whose column in its truth table contains both True and False, so is not a tautology.
It is not a validity (i.e., first-order tautology) either, since varying the definition of ‘mammal’ (an axiom) and, consequently, the interpretation can result in the statement becoming false.
Dr. Bazett's mistake arises from his vague definition of a tautology as “a statement that is always true”.
Sure, the given statement is (always) true in the given context, but it is not true regardless of interpretation, and certainly not always true in its truth-functional form.
Note that even the stronger statement “every dog is a mammal”, which can be formalised (depending on the universe of discourse) either as $$∀x\:\Big(D(x)\implies M(x)\Big)$$ or as $$∀x\,M(x),$$ is neither valid (counterexample: the domain of discourse $\mathbb R,$ with $D(x)$ and $M(x)$ denoting “$x$ is positive” and “$x$ is even”, respectively) nor tautological; in other words, it is not logically true.
On the other hand, the following are all valid arguments: \begin{align}\forall x\:\Big(D(x)\to M(x)\Big)\;\land\; D(d)\implies M(d),\\∀x\,M(x) \implies M(d),\\M(x) \;\land\; x=d\implies M(d).\end{align} To be clear: it is the implications (which aren't tautologies), not their conclusion $M(d)$ (“that dog is a mammal”), that are valid (first-order tautological).
So, “that dog is a mammal” is true by definition then deduction, so we say that it is analytically true (as opposed to synthetically true).
The analogous statement “that mushroom is a plant” is similarly not logically true: it too used to be analytically true, but has been false since the 1960's when fungi got redesignated as a taxonomic kingdom.