I have been reading Mac Lane's Categories for the Working Mathematician, and the prospect of developing category theory without any use of set theory is mentioned more than once in the book, but never actually realised. I was wondering whether there are any good references (books or online notes) that give an account of such a theory of categories. Looking at this question, it seems that topos theory has been one of the successful ways in which category theory can be defined without sets.
So my question is: What are some good references for how to develop category theory without set theory (using toposes or otherwise).
Membership relation free set theory
This is what Lawvere did after his PhD. At first, when he discussed this idea with Eilenberg and Mac Lane the latter two did not believe that this was possible and tried to convince him to drop this idea:
However, Lawvere came up with the membership relation free axioms (ETCS):
Lawvere, An elementary theory of the category of sets
Another reference for his membership relation free axiomatization of sets is his book:
Lawvere, Sets for mathematics (availlable via google as pdf)
I think this is answering the original question of set free category theory, since the category of sets Set is thereby internalized into category theory, i.e. there is no need for set theoretical membership relation when using notions of sets in category theory.
It is however not the point to avoid membership relation, but to take function as a more natural basic notion instead and derive membership and other relevant concepts from there.
Comparison of Lawvere's axioms with ZFC
Lawvere's axioms are characterizing a two-valued topos with infinite object and axiom of choice:
see Lawvere, Sets for mathematics, p. 113.
For a comparison of Lawvere's axioms with ZFC e.g. see Barry W. Cunningham, Boolean topoi and models of ZFC:
Compare:
W. Mitchell, Boolean topoi and the theory of sets, J. Pure Appl. Algebra 2 (1972), 261-. 274
Compare:
T. Leinster, Rethinking set theory (see p. 7 par. 4 and the references there)
Compare:
T. Leinster, Rethinking set theory (see p. 6 'How strong are the axioms?')