Let $\mathcal{L}$ be the formal system of statement calculus. Let $A$ be a formula of $\mathcal{L}$. Then each of the three formulas \begin{gather*} A \vee (\sim A) \\ A \implies [(\sim A) \implies A] \\ (\sim A) \implies [A \implies (\sim A)] \\ \end{gather*} is a theorem of $\mathcal{L}$. By case analysis, $$[(\sim A) \implies A] \vee [A \implies (\sim A)]$$ is a theorem of $\mathcal{L}$. But this seems intuitively incorrect.
For example, each of the statements \begin{gather*} (\forall x \in \mathbb{N})[(x < 3) \implies (x \ge 3)]\\ (\forall x \in \mathbb{N})[(x \ge 3) \implies (x < 3)] \end{gather*} is false. However, the disjunction of these two statements is true, by the argument above.
Edit. I guess the example was not very good.
Suppose you flip a coin. It is a fair coin and it cannot stand up on its side. It lands at your feet on a solid, flat surface.
Let $A$ be the statement that the coin shows heads. Then $(\sim A)$ is the statement that the coin shows tails. The statement \begin{gather*} \text{"if the coin shows heads, then it shows tails,}\\ \text{or}\\ \text{if the coin shows tails, then it shows heads"} \end{gather*} is true, even though both disjuncts are false.
Maybe this question no longer belongs on math.stackexchange.com.
Perhaps what is counter-intuitive is the fact that whenever $A$ is false, then $A\Rightarrow B$ is true, based on how logical implication is defined: $$ \begin{array}{|c|c|c|} \hline A & B & A\Rightarrow B \\ \hline {\bf F} & F & {\bf T}\\ {\bf F} & T & {\bf T}\\ T & F & F\\ T & T & T\\ \hline \end{array} $$
Applied to the example of the coin:
Let's say a coin is flipped, and it shows heads.
Then the following statement is false:
and thus the second half of the disjunction is true:
therefore the whole disjunction is true.
Similarly if tails were shown.