In Chapter 7 ("Inverse limits and direct limits"), subchapter 4 ("Conditions for an inverse limit to be non-empty"), Bourbaki lets $(E_\alpha)_{\alpha \in I}$ be a projective system of sets with connecting maps $(f_{\alpha \beta}) _{\alpha, \beta \in I}$, and for each $\alpha \in I$ he lets $\mathfrak S_\alpha$ be a set of subsets of $E_\alpha$ with the property that "every intersection of sets belonging to $\mathfrak S_\alpha$ also belongs to $\mathfrak S_\alpha$". And then he weirdly claims that
it follows in particular (by considering the intersection of the empty family) that $E_\alpha \in \mathfrak S_\alpha$.
Why should this happen? (This fact is used later in the proof of step 4 of Theorem 1, so it is not a mistype.) It is easy to construct a $\mathfrak S_\alpha$ by choosing $U, V \subsetneq E_\alpha$ and letting $\mathfrak S_\alpha = \{U, V, U \cap V\}$, so that $E_\alpha \notin \mathfrak S_\alpha$ in this example, contradicting Bourbaki.
(By adding one more condition, it seems that Bourbaki wants the $\mathfrak S_\alpha$ to mimick the set of compact subsets of $E_\alpha$ that would exist in a topological setting.)
This is one of those statements which are true vacuously:
In other words: if $\emptyset=\mathcal F\subseteq\mathcal P(A)$ is the empty family of subsets of $A$, then:
$$\bigcap_{X\in\mathcal F}X=A$$
and
$$\bigcup_{X\in\mathcal F}X=\emptyset$$
This is, for example, because $x\in\bigcap_{X\in\mathcal F}X\Longleftrightarrow(\forall X\in\emptyset)x\in X$, which is true for all $x\in A$, again vacuously. ("If you can find $X\in\emptyset$ such that $x\not\in X$, that would be a counterexample - but you can't!") You can similarly justify the second identity.
Note also, if the second identity ("empty union is empty") is easier to "swallow", then you can easily derive the first identity from it using DeMorgan's laws:
$$\bigcap_{X\in\emptyset}X=\left(\bigcup_{X\in\emptyset}X^c\right)^c=\emptyset^c=A$$