If $L^*$ is a consistent extension of L and $\phi$ is a formula which is not a theorem of $L^*$ , then the extension of $L^*$ obtained by including $(¬\phi)$ as an extra axiom is consistent.
Show that any consistent extension $L^*$ of L has a consistent extension ${{L^*}^*}$ which is complete.
This is an 8 mark question that is frequently on past papers. I know it has something to do with a proposition I have; "Suppose $L^*$ is a consistent extension of L and $\phi$ is not a theorem of $L^*$. Let ${{L^*}^*}$ be the extension of $L^*$ obtained by including $(¬\phi)$ as an extra axiom.Then ${{L^*}^*}$ is consistent." But then is the question not asking me to show it is COMPLETE not consistent?
We have the Proposition 1 :
We want to prove the Proposition 2 :
Proof. Let $\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_2$ .... be an enumeration of all the wfs of L. We shall build a sequence $J_0, J_l, J_2$ .. of extensions of L* as follows.
Let
If $\vdash_{J_0} \alpha_0$, let $J_1 = J_0$.
If not $\vdash_{J_0} \alpha_0$, then add $\lnot \alpha_0$ as a new axiom to obtain $J_1$ from $J_0$.
In general, for $n \ge 1$, to construct $J_n$, from $J_{n-1}$ : if $\vdash_{J_{n-1} } \alpha_{n-1}$, then $J_n = J_{n-1}$, and if not $\vdash_{J_{n-1} } \alpha_{n-1}$, then let $J_n$ be the extension of $J_{n-1}$ obtained by adding $\lnot \alpha_{n-1}$ as a new axiom.
L* is consistent, i.e. $J_0$ is consistent, by assumption. For $n \ge 1$, if $J_{n-1}$ is consistent, then $J_n$ is consistent, by Proposition 1 above. Hence by induction, each $J_n$, is consistent ($n \ge 0$).
Now define $J$ to be that extension of L* which has as its axioms all the wfs which are axioms of at least one of the $J_n$.
Now we show that $J$ is consistent. Suppose the contrary. Then there is wfs $\alpha$ such that $\vdash_J \alpha$ and $\vdash_J \lnot \alpha$. Now the proofs in $J$ of $\alpha$ and $\lnot \alpha$ are finite sequences of wfs, so each proof can contain instances of only finitely many of the axioms of $J$.
Therefore there must exist $n$ which is large enough so that all these axioms which are used are axioms of $J_n$. It follows that $\vdash_{J_n} \alpha$ and $\vdash_{J_n} \lnot \alpha$. This contradicts the consistency of $J_n$ and so $J$ must be consistent.
It remains to show that $J$ is complete. Let $\varphi$ be a wf of L. $\varphi$ must appear in the list $\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_2$ .... say $\varphi$ is $\alpha_k$. If $\vdash_{J_k} \alpha_k$, then certainly $\vdash_J \alpha_k$, since $J$ is an extension of $J_k$. If not $\vdash_{J_k} \alpha_k$, then according to the construction of $J_{k+1}$, $\lnot \alpha_k$ is an axiom of $J_{k+1}$, and so $\vdash_{J_{k+1} } \lnot \alpha_k$. This implies that $\vdash_J \lnot \alpha_k$.
So in any case we have $\vdash_J \alpha_k$ or $\vdash_J \lnot \alpha_k$, i.e.
See Alan Hamilton, Logic for mathematicians (2nd ed - 1988), page 41.
Note. The construction above was first used for first-order logic by Adolf Lindenbaum, a Polish mathematician and logician, who was killed by the Nazis in the summer of 1941 [see Geoffrey Hunter, Metalogic: An Introduction to the Metatheory of Standard First Order Logic (1971), page 110.]