Given n men and n women, preference rankings for the women, does Gale-Shapley still find a stable matching if the men only rank a subset of women.
From this variation, it's possible that we end up with single people, but that's ok as this situation is still stable.
- In this variation, some men may not be matched to a woman
- But in that case, the man is content being single
- Since women rank all men, some woman preferred that man, but that man didn't prefer that woman
- Therefore having unmatched men and women is stable since
My problem is justifying the rest of the matching is also stable
Do I prove it by contradiction?
Gayle-Shapely fails to find the matching somteimes
Suppose that we have 2 men and 2 women. Suppose that $m_1$ has preference ranking $w_1$, $w_2$, and $m_2$ has preference ranking $w_1$ (and vetoes $w_2$).
Also suppose that $w_1$ has ranking $m_1$, $m_2$. The ranking for $w_2$ is unknown but doesn't matter. Now, there is 1 perfect matching of men to women they have not vetoed.
Namely, match $m_2$ to $w_1$ and $m_1$ to $w_2$. However, this is not stable, since $m_1$ and $w_2$ prefer each other over such a matching.
(The matching in which $m_1$ is matched to $w_1$ and $m_2$, $w_2$ remain isolated is stable but Gayle-Shapely fails to find it.)