I am becoming increasingly convinced that Wildberger's views are, if a little bizarre, at least not hopelessly inconsistent.
When I was reading the comments in the video following (MF17), somebody said something that shocked me a bit, because I was unable to give a rebuttal that I found satisfactory:
The reason I consider [the axiom of infinity] restrictive is that it forces you to accept the existence of a certain set that has all sorts of bizarre properties, like the existence of one-to-one and onto mappings from some sets to proper supersets. That screws up your attempts to assign cardinalities to sets (see the continuum hypothesis), and it doesn't even buy you much: can you have a set of all sets? Why not? The real question is, what do you think infinite sets actually buy you in terms of reasoning power?
The point about the continuum hypothesis is arguably meaningless; as I understand it CH says that it is hard to assign to each cardinality a set, but nothing about the difficulty of assigning each set a cardinality.
However, the core of the question is a bit harder for me to answer. My immediate response is it that allowing infinity gives a sort of completeness. But as the person pointed out, it doesn't finish the job, it just (dramatically) kicks down the line where the new notion of "too big" is. Introducing classes pushes it even further, but the same problem arises, I think: there is still no class of all classes.
So my next idea was, well, infinity doesn't buy me reasoning power but it does provide a satisfying source of many examples. But I'm not sure if that's true either: Wildberger's alternative to ZFC is (if consistent) a type theory, or at least it uses the language of type theory. I know very little about type theory so if you want to reference it in an answer, it would be great if you could use small words :)
With type theory on your side it's not even clear that I have a much less restrictive universe of objects which I can speak about; just a not-entirely-arbitrary boundary where sets are no longer permitted and types must take over. This could be dramatically the wrong picture, since as I said I am very new at this.
And now I'm stuck. Can anyone save Cantor's paradise for me?
I could argue against Wildeberger's philosophical views directly, but I don't really see the point.
The reason is that philosophical arguments aren't a very good method for making decisions. What works much better, in almost every case, is experimentation and evidence. If we want to figure out the best foundations for mathematics, the only effective method is to experiment: we should invent some foundations, and then figure out what mathematics you can make with it.
So what does the axiom of infinity buy you? Well, all of modern mathematics.
I can't think of a single field of mathematics that doesn't use the axiom of infinity on a regular basis, and I can't imagine how virtually any of the important results in mathematics discovered over the last century could be proven or even stated without the axiom of infinity. It is enormously conceptually helpful to be able to consider infinite collections of objects.
Overall, ZFC has been quite successful as a foundation for mathematics over the last century, and it would take an enormous amount of evidence to convince the mathematical community to switch to some other foundation.
If Wildberger wants to show that mathematics would be better off without the axiom of infinity, he will need demonstrate that his alternative foundations are either cleaner or more powerful than ZFC. The first step would be to get some set theorists interested in a workable version of set theory that doesn't include the axiom of infinity, so that they can start to investigate the mathematics that results. This is not unheard of: there has been a lot of work, for example, on the new foundations as a possible alternative to ZFC, or on non-standard analysis as a possible alternative to analysis.
But it does very little good to argue abstractly about possible shortcomings of ZFC without offering a workable alternative, where "workable" means "sufficient for developing virtually all of mathematics". If you can't get Fermat's last theorem and the Poincare conjecture, then you don't have a viable alternative to ZFC.