According to the definitions I have been taught, if a proof system is complete, $\text{If}\ A \Rightarrow B\ \text{then}\ A \vdash B$, and if a proof system is sound, $\text{If}\ A \vdash B\ \text{then}\ A \Rightarrow B$.
Given a proof system that is complete but not sound, let A, B be two propositions. Is it necessarily correct to say that $\text{If}\ A \Rightarrow B\ \text{then}\ A \mkern-2mu\not\mkern2mu\vdash B$ and also $\text{If}\ A \vdash B\ \text{then}\ A \mkern-2mu\not\mkern2mu\Rightarrow B\ $?
My reasoning is as follows:
If the system is not sound then it's not true that $(\text{If}\ A \vdash B\ \text{then}\ A \Rightarrow B)$. Therefore: $$\lnot((A \vdash B) \rightarrow (A \Rightarrow B))$$ $$\lnot(\lnot(A\vdash B) \lor (A \Rightarrow B))$$ $$(A\vdash B) \land \lnot(A \Rightarrow B)$$ $$(A\vdash B)$$ $$(A \mkern-2mu\not\mkern2mu\Rightarrow B)$$
Since $A \Rightarrow B$ is False, it can be the left-hand-side of any implication and make it true. Since $(A\vdash B)$ and $(A \mkern-2mu\not\mkern2mu\Rightarrow B)$, therefore, $\text{If}\ A \vdash B\ \text{then}\ A \mkern-2mu\not\mkern2mu\Rightarrow B$ can be concluded. Is my reasoning correct?
Your basic idea is correct, but you are missing an important bit: There is an implicit universal quantification in the definitions:
So when a proof system is not sound, what is negated is the universality of the implication:
This is in turn equivalent to an existential negated statement:
And this is in turn equivalent ot the following:
So if a proof system is unsound, then some of the proofs it produces are not semantically valid. It doesn't have to be per se that everything it proves is nonsense.
This may be even more convincing on the incompleteness side: The word "incomplete" just means that some sequents are missing from the proof system; it doesn't have to be that that it fails to prove all sequents whatsoever.
If a proof sytem is unsound and complete, then all the semantically valid inferences can be proven, but in addition it proves some sequents that are not actually valid.
Edit (changing my last pargraph thanks to Malice Vendrine's comment):
Note also that those provable but invalid sequents do not have to be contradictory: It might just be that they are not true in all structures. For example, a system that proves $\vdash A \lor B \to A$ would be unsound, because this inference is not universally valid. But neither is its negation (there may well be structures in which the formula is satisfied, for example, in any structure in which $A$ is true).
So proving non-valid formulas does not immediately lead to an inconsistency. Only if we can prove the negation of a formula that is valid (and hence, by completeness, also provable) or, vice versa, a formula whose negation is valid, unsoundness in combination with completeness makes the system inconsistent.