Can the natural numbers contain an element that is not representable by a number?

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I read the following document: https://www.math.wustl.edu/~freiwald/310peanof.pdf . In this document, the author wants to formalize that natural numbers, that are informally thought of as a collection of $0,1,2,3,...$ (this is not really a set, is it? Meaning, something like $\{0,1,2,3,...\}$ doesnt have a formal meaning, does it?).

To formalize this idea, one has the Peano-axioms, which should intuitively be satisfied by what we think of the natural numbers. The author proceeds to construct $\mathbf{N}$ by using the axiom of infinity of ZFC and defining $\mathbf{N}:=\bigcap \{J: J \ \text{is an inductive set}\}$, where an inductive set is defined to be a set that has the properties:

$(i)$ $\emptyset \in J$

$(ii)$ if $x \in J$ then $s(x) \in J$. ($s(x)$ denotes the successor)

The set $\mathbf{N}$ as defined above indeed satisfies the Peano-axioms and one defines $0:=\emptyset,1:=\{\emptyset\},2:=\{\emptyset, \{\emptyset\}\}$ and so on. This gives that $\mathbf{N}$ indeed contains every object we consider to be a natural number. However, why can't it contain any "odd" elements, meaning elements that are not in the collection of $0,1,2,3,4,...$. Im looking for a formal way to prove this, but I am unsure if this is possible. I know that it is provable that any object $n \in \mathbf{N}$ is either $0$ or the successor of a natural number. However, I am not sure if it is formally provable from this that $\mathbf{N}$ only contains "numbers" and no other elements. Every argument I can think of is pretty hand-wavy and rather informal.

Edit: Might this be a way to do it? The object $0$ is an element in the collection $\{0,1,2,3,...\}$. Let $n$ be an object in this collection. Then also, by definition, $s(n)$ is an object in this collection, by definition of the collection (it contains the successors of the elements). I just wondered if the property "an element of the collection $\{0,1,2,3,...\}$" would be too informal to use for an induction.

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What do you mean precisely by "odd element"? Essentially, the intersection of all inductive sets (or equivalently, the least inductive set with respect to $\subseteq$) is the formal definition of the set of natural numbers, hence giving a formal definition of "natural number" (i.e., "member of the least inductive set"), so by definition, there are no things in that set that are not natural numbers.

However, this question relates to non-standard models of PA / ZFC. The discussion in the preceding paragraph is all from the point of view of the universe $V$ of ZFC we are working in. If $V$ contains a smaller universe $U$ of ZFC, i.e. $U\in V$, then $U$ and $V$ might disagree about what the least inductive set is. Write $I^U$ for the least inductive set as computed in $U$, and $I^V$ for that computed in $V$. For simplicity, let's assume $I^V\subseteq I^U$ and $U$ agrees with $V$ about membership on the sets in $I^V$, so e.g., they both have the same empty set $\emptyset$, the same set $\{\emptyset\}$, the same $\{\emptyset,\{\emptyset\}\}$, etc, for all the elements of $I^V$. Now it can be that $I^V\subsetneq I^U$, and since $U$ thinks that $I^U$ is the least inductive set, it follows that $I^V\notin U$. Since $U$ thinks that $I^U$ is the least inductive set, $U$ has to think that every element of $I^U$ is either $\emptyset$ or a successor $x\cup\{x\}$. It follows that from the view of $V$, the $\in^U$-ordering (i.e. using the membership relation in $U$) of $I^U$ looks like $I^V\frown D$, where $D$ is some discrete strict linear order without endpoints (here $I^V\frown D$ denotes the ordering where $I^V$ is first, followed above by $D$). So $D$ indeed contains "odd" elements from the point of view of $V$, but $U$ disagrees, and thinks that these elements are true natural numbers. In $U$, the "cut" $I^V$ cannot be seen (as $I^V\notin U$), so there is no (obvious) contradiction. (The model $U$ is a non-standard model of ZFC.)

Working in our universe $V$ of ZFC, assuming $V$ thinks ZFC is consistent, these sorts of models $U$ can be formed by using the compactness theorem applied to the theory ZFC + T, where T uses constant symbols $n$ for each $n\in\mathbb{N}$, plus one further constant symbol $x$, and contains the formulas "$x$ is a natural number" and "$n<x$", for each natural number $n$. (One needs a little more thought to arrange the condition that $I^V\subseteq I^U$ and they agree about membership there.)

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However, why can't it contain any "odd" elements, meaning elements that are not in the collection of 0,1,2,3,4,.... Im looking for a formal way to prove this $\dotsc$

To have a formal way to prove that, you'd first need a formal definition of $0, 1, 2, 3, 4, \dotsc$, some external criterion for judging whether Freiwald's set $$S = \{x \in I \colon \text{for every inductive set $J$, $x \in J$}\}$$ truly does contain (all the natural numbers and) nothing but the natural numbers.

Freiwald's position is that no such criterion exists. More precisely, there is a necessary condition, that $S$ is a Peano system, but there is no sufficient condition. And, according to Freiwald, that is nothing to worry about:

Mathematicians don't care (unless they are becoming philosophers) what whole numbers “really are” --- how they behave is what counts.

Once you're satisfied that $S$ is a Peano system, and that Peano systems behave as natural number systems should behave, you have a few options for how to proceed. The one Freiwald proposes is that we should agree to define the natural number system as $S$. Then it is true that $S$ contains all the natural numbers and only the natural numbers, but this is truth by convention, not truth by correspondence with pre-existing facts.

If that doesn't satisfy you, then the best comfort available may be this: once you're satisfied that $S$ is a Peano system, and that Peano systems behave as natural number systems should behave, then you can be satisfied that you won't get into trouble mathematically by identifying the natural numbers with $S$; that $S$ won't embarrass you by having a maximum element, or an element that lies strictly between $1$ and $2$, or otherwise does something that no natural number should do.

How can you satisfy yourself that $S$ is a Peano system? Since Peano systems are formally defined, that can be proved formally, and Freiwald does so. How can you satisfy that Peano systems behave as natural number systems should behave? Since "how natural numbers should behave" isn't defined formally, that can't be proved formally. What can be done, and what Freiwald does, is to construct addition, multiplication, and the order relation within a Peano system, and show that they have various expected properties.

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Axioms P1 through P4 from the document will indeed get you that $0, s(0), s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), ...$ are all part of $P$, and are all different from each other (thus, informally: $0,1,2,3, ...$ all become part of $P$). But you're right: by themselves they don't rule out the existence of further ('odd') objects that could be in $P$ but that are not identical to any of the objects in the sequence $0, s(0), s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), ...$

But this is exactly what axiom P5 is for! Axiom P5 says that any set $A$ that is subset of $P$ and that contains $0, s(0), s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), ...$ will have to equal $P$. So, $P$ cannot contain elements other than $0, s(0), s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), ...$, because (proof by contradiction) if it did, then we could consider the subset $A$ of $P$ that still contains exactly the elements $0, s(0), s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), ...$ but not any others: this $A$ would not equal $P$ (because $P$ would contain those 'other' elements that you throw out in the construction of $A$), and hence axiom P5 would be violated.

In effect, axiom $P5$ says that $P$ is the smallest set that contains all of $0,1,2,3, ...$. So, axiom P5 that will ensure that $P$ does not contain any 'odd' elements in addition to $0,1,2,3, ...$

For what it's worth, below is a formal proof of what I just said. That is, I show that given axiom P5, you can rule out the existence of any subset of $P$ that would still contain all elements $0,1,2,3,...$, but that would be a strict subset of $P$ (thus ruling out any of those 'odd' elements):

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