Given the following problem, I am not quite sure how to solve it. Disclaimer: This is a problem from a provided mock exam.
--> Consider the game Rock, Paper, Scissors. Both players simultaneously choose one of the three options Rock, Paper, or Scissors. A player who plays R will beat another player who has chosen S ("rock crushes scissors") but will lose to one who has played P ("paper covers rock"); a play of P will lose to a play of S ("scissors cut paper"). Assume that the payoffs are the following: when a player wins, the payoff is 1and when she loses the payoff is -1. If both players choose the same item and there is a tie, each get 0 points.
a) Let δ = 1.- Show that the mixed-strategy Nash-eguilibrium of the game Rock, Paper, Scissors is (1/3,1/3,1/3)(1/3,1/3,1/3) b) For which values of &(Scissors, Rock) becomes a pure strategy Nash-equilibrium?
Would be grateful for any help!