Does a strictly dominated strategy necessarily consist of only non-rationalizable pure strategies?

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Consider the following question:

Mascheler, Solan, Zamir, Problem no. 5.15 I have solved part (a) using the example below:

Example payoff matrix of 2-player game
Here (1/2)T+ (1/2)B is a mixed strategy (MS) strictly dominated by B (which is a MS because all pure strategies (PS) are MS's). But [(1/3)M+(2/3)B,(1/3)M+(2/3)B] is the only Nash equilibrium here, which involves PS M, which was there in the support of the strictly dominated MS [(1/2)T+ (1/2)B]. Hence the claim is not true.

But I'm not able to understand the difference between (a) and (b). They come across as the same condition to me. Any suggestions? Thanks in advance.