I am attempting the following problem and was hoping to get some guidance/tips based off of what I have so far:
You toss a card that is black on one side and red on the other. The probability of it landing on black, P(B) = 1/2 and the probability of it landing on red, P(R) = 1/2. With that in mind, we can play the following two games:
Game I: Win 1.00 if it lands on black, and lose 0.50 if it lands on red.
Game II: Win 5.00 if it lands on black, and lose 6.00 if it lands on red.
Suppose I and II are random variables that represent your earnings when playing games I and II. Find the following:
E(I) \begin{align*} E(I)=\frac{1}{2}(1.00)+\frac{1}{2}(-0.50)=0.25\\ \end{align*}
E(II) \begin{align*} E(II)=\frac{1}{2}(5.00)+\frac{1}{2}(-6.00)=-0.50\\ \end{align*}
E(I + II) \begin{align*} E(I + II)= E(I) + E(II) = 0.25 + (-0.50) = -0.25\\ ; linearity (?) \end{align*}
Then find the following:
var(I) \begin{align*} var(I)= E[(I-\mu)^2] = (1.00-0.25)^2(\frac{1}{2})+(-0.50-0.25)^2(\frac{1}{2}) = 0.5625\\ \end{align*}
var(II) \begin{align*} var(II)= E[(II-\mu)^2] = (5.00-(-0.50))^2(\frac{1}{2})+(-6.00-(0.50))^2(\frac{1}{2}) = 30.25\\ \end{align*}
cov(I,II) \begin{align*} cov(I,II)= E(I*II)-E(I)E(II) = E(I*II)-(0.25)(0.50); E(I*II)=(?) \\ \end{align*}
var(I + II) \begin{align*} var(I+II)= ? \\ \end{align*}
Based on what was computed above, answer the following:
Is a single game of game I or game II riskier?; A single game of game II because E(II) < E(I).
Which single game is the most profitable in the long run, game I or game II?; A single game of game I for the same reason as above.
- Suppose you have an infinite amount of money and you can play game I or game II as many times as you want. What is the most profitable strategy (only play game I, only play game II, play both game I and game II but game I two times more frequently than game II, etc.)
First of all, yes, $\mathsf{E}[\cdot]$ is a linear operator, so your justification for $\mathsf{E}[I+II]$ holds.
For $\mathsf{E}[I*II],$ let $X=I$ and $Y=II$. Then $I*II = XY$.
$$\mathsf{E}[XY] = \sum_kk\cdot P(XY=k)$$
$XY$ has four possible outcomes, each with probability $\frac14$:$-6,-2.5,3,5.$ So
$$\mathsf{E}[XY]=\frac14(-6-2.5+3+5)=-\frac18 \\ \therefore \mathcal{Cov}(I,II)=\mathcal{Cov}(X,Y)=\mathsf{E}[XY]-\mathsf{E}[X]\mathsf{E}[Y]=-\frac18-(0.25)(-0.5)=0$$
This result should not be surprising because games $I$ and $II$ are clearly independent. Then
$$\mathcal{Var}(X+Y)=\mathcal{Var}(X)+\mathcal{Var}(Y)+0=30.8125$$
$1.$ This is sort of an odd question: what is meant by "riskier"? More likely to lose money? Or has more uncertainty? In either case, game $II$ is riskier, but the reasoning is either because of the difference in expectations or the differences in variances, depending on what you think your teacher means.
$2.$ You're right on this one
$3.$ I agree with Nameless' answer, but for a little more reasoning consider this system of equations: $\mathsf{E}[aX+bY]$ and $a+b=1$. Then if we maximize $\mathsf{E}$ according to $a$ and $b$, we will have found the optimal long-run proportion of $X$ and $Y$ games that should be played.
$$\mathsf{E}[aX+bY]=a\mathsf{E}[X]+b\mathsf{E}[Y]=\frac14a-\frac12b$$ Since $a+b=1$,
$$\frac14a-\frac12b=\frac14-\frac34b \\ \therefore \cfrac{d}{db}\mathsf{E}[aX+bY] = -\frac34$$
$\therefore \ $ As the proportion of $II$ games played increases, $\mathsf{E}$ decreases. Thus no $II$ games played is the optimal strategy.