Recently I have been reading about Tarski-Grothendieck set theory, and have been impressed by its short axiomatisation, inclusion of inaccessible cardinals, and capability of supporting category theory without proper classes. http://mizar.org/JFM/pdf/tarski.pdf.
However, I am somewhat confused by its first axiom, which states that everything is a set. It then formulates extensionality by saying that two sets are equal if they have the same members, and Tarski's axiom by saying that every set is a member of a Grothendieck universe. This seems unnecessarily complex to me. Using the definition of a set as a "class that is a member of a class", wouldn't the statements ∀a∀b (a = b ⇔ ∀c (c ∈ a ⇔ c ∈ b)) and ∀a∃U (a ∈ U), where U is a Grothendieck universe, prove that if an object has no members, it would be the empty set, and that anything else would of course be a set, as it would both have members and be a member of a Grothendieck universe.
Am I misunderstanding something, or is there some other reason for using the set axiom?
You're reading it "wrong". They only clarify the context, that all the variables indicate sets, and not some atomic objects like you might want to think about the real numbers as being "numbers" rather than sets.
Note that this is a short paper related to the Mizar system, which is a proof assistant. Since proof assistants are meant to be used by mathematicians who might not subscribe to the notion "everything is a set", it is a good idea to remind them of this fact when it is relevant.
From a set theoretic foundational perspective, yeah, nothing is new by this update. For other people? Well, that might not be the case.