The Peano axioms are usually stated as follows:
Zero is a number.
If a is a number, the successor of a is a number.
zero is not the successor of a number.
Two numbers of which the successors are equal are themselves equal.
(induction axiom.) If a set S of numbers contains zero and also the successor of every number in S, then every number is in S.
One can formalize Peano arithmetic as a theory of second-order sentences over the signature $\{0, s\}$ just by formalizing the axioms 3 to 5. So are 1 and 2 really axioms or are they just type declarations?
You're right, in the formalism of second-order logic the first two "axioms" are really the signature.
Of course there might (for all I know) be other formalisms where this way of writing them makes sense.