In their book "Winning Ways for Your Mathematical Plays", Berlekamp, Conway, and Guy used as the 7th condition for a combinatorial game "Both players know what is going on; There is complete information. There is no occasion for bluffing."
Is the "more recent" notion of "perfect information" generally accepted as part of the correct definition, or is this a point of controversy in CGT? So it would seem that the more recent notion would be that a combinatorial game would have perfect information, but may or may not have complete information. So far as I can tell the trio never explicitly define "complete information", nor do they use it in a way that is inconsistent with "perfect information." I don't remember seeing "perfect information" anywhere in the book.
The terminology may not be completely standard, but:
In combinatorial game theory, the games considered are those in which the players have complete knowledge of the state of the game, and there are no random events. (There are also some other conditions on the games in CGT that I won't mention here.) A common term in CGT for such games is "game of no chance". This includes chess, go, Othello, etc.
However, "perfect information game" sometimes includes games like Backgammon or Monopoly, which although they have random events (dice rolls), they still do not have any information which is known to one player but not another. (The probabilities of all random events must be known to all players.)
On the other hand, in most card games, you can only see your own cards; thus the players have different information sets, so card games are usually games of imperfect information.
Why do we put Backgammon or Monopoly in with games like chess or go? One important property they have in common is that, at least in theory, bluffing is impossible. In a game like poker, I can bluff because my opponents can't see my cards, thus I can take actions to (mis)convey information about my hand. But in Backgammon, even though there are dice rolls involved, I don't know any more about them than my opponent does, and I cannot influence them, so I cannot bluff. As a result, in a finite, two-player game of perfect information, the optimal strategy is always a pure strategy, even if there are random events involved.