I am wondering whether if $P$ is the only sufficient condition for $Q$ besides $Q$ itself (by which I mean that $[P \implies Q] \wedge [(R \implies Q) \implies (R\equiv P \vee R \equiv Q)]$, then $P$ is necessary for $Q$. I am unsure because $Q$ is sufficient for $Q$, which makes it seem that $Q$ could be sufficient for itself and it could be true without $P$ being true, meaning that $P$ isn't necessary for $Q$.
Also, is is my reasoning correct for how I justify that for any proposition $Q$, $Q\implies Q$? I reason that because we assume that the same proposition has the same value in all contexts, the truth of $Q$ is sufficient to conclude the truth of $Q$ because $Q$ can't suddenly change into being false in the context in which we are considering its boolean value. Is this sound?
If $P$ is sufficient for $Q$, then trivially $P \land R$ is sufficient for $Q$ for each and every $R$.
So in exactly what good sense could $P$ be a sufficient condition for $Q$ and the only one (other than $Q$)?