When learning Peano axioms normally we use induction to suggest that if a property $P(0)$ is true, and if $P(k)$ being true implies $P(k + 1)$ being true (for natural number $k$), then if $P$ is the property of being a natural number, we start with $0$ being a natural number by definition, then by induction $1$ is a natural number, $2$ is a natural number, $3$ is a natural number, etc.
This is done to prohibit things like $5.3$ or $\pi$ from being natural since they are not reachable when applying the successor function from $0$.
But what I don't understand:
Just because we can point to the $0, 1, 2, 3, ...$ chain as being natural numbers, what stops us from making some other chain and calling them natural numbers?
If your answer to #1 is "Well we never provided a mechanism for saying that they were natural numbers to begin with" then what was the "risk" or issue if they posed no threat? Why do we have to specifically label the stuff connected to $0$ as natural numbers when it's more or less implied that the rules we're setting up are specifically for defining what rules natural numbers follow?
Absolutely nothing stops you from doing this, and indeed you can. This is the idea of non-standard models of arithmetic.
Peano arithmetic can prove, for instance, that the numbers 0,1,2,3,... exist, and for instance, that the only numbers less than 3 are 0, 1, 2. So if you want the Peano axioms to hold, your "chain" has to start out with 0,1,2,3,... without any other numbers in between.
(When I write something like "2" here, I just mean "the number that is the successor of the successor of 0". You can give these numbers different symbols if you like, and think of the chain as starting out $0, q, \text{fish}, \dots$ but that won't really make it a different chain.)
However, there might possibly be additional numbers that come after this initial chain; Peano arithmetic can't prove that there aren't (assuming it's consistent), and so tacking on such numbers will not introduce any inconsistencies, so long as it's done in a careful way to make sure the additional "infinitely large" numbers still satisfy the Peano axioms.