Column
Left Middle Right
Up 2,10 1, 3 7, -4
Row Sideways 7, 6 −7, −16 2, 5
Down 6, 1 2, 20 0, 15
I'm having trouble finding the mixed strategy equilibrium for this game
I've already concluded there is no iterated dominance and have found two pure nash eqilibria (S,L) and (D,M) Now I need to find the mix strategy nash equilibrium but I've gotten 3/5 probability for p2 R and 1/5 for the remaining but they don't make sense when I plug them back into the formula.
Conjecture that player 1 plays Up with probability $p_1$, Sideways with probability $p_2$ and Down with $1-p_1-p_2$. Do the same with player 2. If player 1 is playing a mixed strategy then the expected payoff of playing either Up, Down or Sideways must be equal. Use that to solve for $q_1$ and $q_2$. Repeat for player 2 to solve for $p_1$ and $p_2$.