In 1933 Skolem constructed models for arithmetic containing infinite numbers. In a 1977 article Stillwell emphasized the constructive nature of Skolem's approach; see here. Is this at odds with Tennenbaum's theorem on nonrecursivity?
This question is related to a comment exchange at Does evaluating hyperreal $f(H)$ boil down to $f(±∞)$ in the standard theory of limits? where terms like "fictitious" are being applied to nonstandard models, as well as the following comment:
"You wrote that hyperreals 'have precise definitions' (plural), which they do not. No matter how 'precise definition' is interpreted (definable, constructive, Borel, ZF+DC), there is no such way to name an individual H. The role of ZFC in your arguments is indistinguishable from a single axiom 'an H exists'. When we assume a Zeus exists, draw conclusions that apply to any element of the set of Zeuses, and the argument works equally well with Zeus replaced by any Greek male over 180cm tall, then Zeus is used only as a metaphor, (...)."
Note. The point about a nonstandard model of arithmetic is that one can do a significant fragment of calculus just using the quotient field of such a model. Avigad did something similar in his article in 2005: Avigad, Jeremy. Weak theories of nonstandard arithmetic and analysis. Reverse mathematics 2001, 19–46, Lect. Notes Log., 21, Assoc. Symbol. Logic, La Jolla, CA, 2005. See here.
I don't really see the connection with the linked question, but to address your question in the first paragraph: No, the two results are not at odds. Skolem's construction is not effective - see the Ramsey-style argument going from the end of page 149 to the middle of page 150. All of this is non-computable. (Note also that it's not unique, either: there are many different ways to follow this construction, which will produce non-isomorphic models.)
The sense in which it is constructive is that it can be used to produce a definable nonstandard model (actually, several definable nonstandard models) of arithmetic. However, definable is much broader than computable. (Also, I believe most logicians would disagree with calling this "constructive," and I note that Stillwell does not use that word in his article.)
A further edit: Perhaps surprisingly, there are definable hyperreals. This was proved by Shelah and Kanovei - see http://arxiv.org/abs/math/0311165 published in Journal of Symbolic Logic; see http://www.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=2039354
(Also notice that "hyperreals" and "nonstandard model of arithmetic" are very different things!)