I started to study propositional modal logic and Kripke semantics. I learned that for any Kripke interpration $\mathcal{M}$, we have that, if $\mathcal{M} \models A$ then $\mathcal{M} \models \Box A$. From which also follows that for all frames $\mathcal{F}$, if $\mathcal{F} \models A$, then $\mathcal{F} \models \Box A$, which again makes sense.
But then I read that $F \supset \Box F$ is not valid in general. I didn't understand this part. I mean, if the validy of $F$ implies the validity of $\Box F$, then the formula $F \supset \Box F$ should be valid.
If someone can give me a concrete counter-example to $F \supset \Box F$, I would be glad. I also want to hear whether there is any frame in which $F \supset \Box F$ is valid.
The property :
is the ground for the Rule of Necessitation.
It says that $\square \varphi$ is a theorem of a normal modal logic whenever $\varphi$ is a theorem of the logic.
This does not contradict the fact that $\varphi \to \square \varphi$ is not valid.
A "tricky" but simple counterexample can be manufactured considering a propositional letter $p$.
Clearly, $\nvDash p$ and thus (vacuously) : if $\vDash p$, then $\vDash \square p$ holds.
But :