I see in some explanations of attempts to formalize numbers such as Von Neumann's ordinals like in this rather philosophical question that we can draw a distinction between a real number '1' and a natural number '1', obviously in mathematical contexts I have encountered, we describe these as one and the same object, is this distinction one of a simply philosophical nature, And does it affect the rigor of mathematical foundations to treat them as one and the same, as we tend to do?
Do we ever see the number '2' as a natural number differently than '2' as a real number? Are they considered different objects? Is there any definitive answer?
To what extent is it fine to treat there as being one 'number' that exists? As you may see in the answers below (and in this question) some seem to believe they are the same object with different set based representations, two different objects.
try to avoid going too much into advanced set theory formalism as they are far above my level
If you want to show the theory of non-negative integers has a model in set theory, you're likely to represent $0$ as the empty set and $n+1$ as $S\cup\{S\}$, where $S$ represents $n$. If you want to do something similar for the theory of real numbers, you need to do things a different way I won't spell out in full, and each real number is then represented with a specific set.
But while $1$ is represented differently in these two cases, it's not identified with such representations, which in both cases are by no means unique. It's much more helpful to say e.g. $\Bbb N\subseteq\Bbb Z\subseteq\Bbb Q\subseteq\Bbb R\subseteq\Bbb C$. For each such $\subseteq$, there's an overhaul in how we represent the numbers, but that's only because the theories of such sets of numbers are progressively more complicated, not because the "old" numbers aren't also "new" numbers.
If you're worried about that, proceed as follows:
If you're not worried about it - indeed, most of the time most mathematicians aren't - you'd not bother with any such numbers-as-sets formalism. But to those who are insistent on such a formalism, I say this: why don't you demand a similar treatment of the sets themselves?