Play rock, scissor and paper. If you win by rock, you get 2 points, if you win by paper or scissor, you get one point. If you are tie, you get zero point. Provide a strategy that you can get more points than your rival.
First of all, what are the probabilities like in this game?
Because you have $1/3$ chance to win on every move, but you also have $1/3$ chance of selecting a move(R, S, or P). Should we account for that in probability or not?
You cannot always pick rock because your opponent knows that you have an incentive to do that and thus he would choose paper and beat you.
Perhaps we should calculate the Nash equilibrium for this game. The payoff matrix is as below. Rows/columns are indexed as R, P, S and the payoffs in the matrix are for the player whose options are on the left, call it player 1.
$$ \begin{pmatrix} 0 & -1 & 2 \\ 1 & 0 & -1 \\ -2 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} $$
Let the player 1 play rock, paper or scissors with probabilities $p_1, p_2$ and $1-p_1-p_2$ respectively. Similarly define $q_1, q_2$ for player 2. Now we can write the expected value for the payoff of player 1 when playing R, P, S are
$$ \begin{aligned} &E_R = p_1(-q_2 + 2(1-q_1-q_2)) \\ &E_P = p_2(q_1 - (1-q_1-q_2)) \\ &E_S = (1-p_1-p_2)(-2q_1+q_2) \end{aligned}$$
Now, we know that neither player will have the upperhand, so all these expected values should be equal to $0$. The bottom two say that we should have $q_1 = \frac{1}{4}, q_2=\frac{1}{2}$, (it will be similarly for $p$'s by symmetry). So you play paper with probability half and the others with one fourth. But I don't know why the first equation doesn't work. Making some of the probabilities zero doesn't work either, or I can't see it.
EDIT: Oh, but yes the first equation does also give $\frac{1}{2}+2(1-\frac{1}{4}-\frac{1}{2}) = 0$. Well anyway, I also did this simulation and it backs up that indeed $[\frac{1}{4},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{4}]$ is correct.